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370 ( 1992), limits CPA liability for negligently-prepared au
1 86 1 .02(a), 10 CCR section 2632.8 permits insurers to use
dits to those with whom the CPA has privity of contract and
individual optional factors that have a greater impact in the
certain other persons "who act in reliance upon those misrep
determination of rates and premiums than one or more of the
resentations in a transaction which the auditor intended to
three mandatory factors . ... " The matter is currently pending
influence." The Second District
before the First District Court of
determi ned that the Insurance
Appeal.
The Second District held that certified publ ic
On March 1 7, the California accountants owe a duty to the I nsurance Commissioner-to whom audits
Supreme Court declined to review Commissioner to ad equately disclose the of insurance companies must be
the Second D istrict C ourt of financial condition of insurance companies, and submitted and who has the statu
Appeal ' s dec i s i o n in A rthur m ay b e liabl e to the C o m missioner (as tory responsibility of monitoring
Andersen LLP v. Superior Court l i q u i dator on b e half o f the c o m pany's insurance companies to ensure
(Charles Quackenbush, Real policyholders and creditors) for negligently their ability to pay i nsurance
claims-"is within the universe
Party in Interest), 67 Cal. App. prepared audits of insurance companies.
of persons to whom an auditor in
4th 148 1 (Nov. 24, 1 998). In that
[Andersen's] position may be li
matter, the Second District held
able for negligent misrepresentation in an audit report pursu
that certified public accountants owe a duty to the Insurance
ant to...Bily." The Second District decided only the legal is
Commissioner to adequately disclose the financial condition
sue of whether Andersen owed a duty to the Commissioner
of insurance companies, and may be liable to the Commis
under Bily, not whether Andersen was negligent in auditing
sioner (as l iquidator on behalf of the company's policyhold
Cal-American's financial statements; that issue has been reers and creditors) for negligently-prepared audits of insur
manded for trial in superior court.
ance companies. Bily v. Arthur Young & Company, 3 Cal. 4th
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he California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) was
created in 1 9 1 1 to regulate privately-owned utilities
and ensure reasonable rates and service for the public.
Today, under the Public Utilities Act of 1 95 1 , Public Utilities
Code section 201 et seq. , the PUC regulates more than 470
privately-owned and operated gas, electric, telephone, water,
sewer, steam, and pipeline utilities, as well as 4,300 truck,
bus, railroad, light rail, ferry, and other transportation com
panies in California. The Commission grants operating au
thority, regulates service standards, and monitors utility op
erations for safety.
It is the duty of the Commission to see that the public
receives adequate services at rates which are fair and reason
able both to customers and utility shareholders. Overseeing
this effort are five commissioners appointed by the Governor
with Senate approval. The commissioners serve six-year stag
gered terms.
The Commission has quasi-legislative authority in that
it establishes and enforces administrative regulations, some
of which are codified in Chapter I , Title 20 of the California
Code of Regulations (CCR). The Commission also has quasi
judicial authority; like a court, it may take testimony, sub
poena witnesses and records, and issue decisions and orders.
The PUC's Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Division sup
ports the Commission's decisionmaking process; PUC ALJs

preside over evidentiary and other types
of hearings and forward recommended decisions to the Com
mission, which makes all final policy, procedural, and other
decisions. In its decisionmaking, the Commission attempts
to balance the public interest and need for reliable, safe util
ity services at reasonable rates with the need to ensure that
utilities operate efficiently, remain financially viable, and
provide stockholders with an opportunity to earn a fair return
on their investment. The PUC encourages ratepayers, utili
ties, consumer, and industry organizations to participate in
its proceedings.
PUC staff-which i nclude economists, engineers, ALJs,
accountants, attorneys, administrative and clerical support
staff, and safety and transportation specialists-are organized
into twelve major divisions and offices, including industry
specific divisions addressing energy, telecommunications, rail
safety and carriers, and water. The Commission's Consumer
Services Division attempts to resolve consumer complaints
regarding utility service, safety, and billing problems; its vari
ous branches provide consumers with information, analysis,
conflict resolution, and advocacy services to help them make
intelligent decisions about utility purchases. The San Fran
cisco-based Public Advisor's Office and the Commission's
outreach offices in Los Angeles and San Diego provide pro
cedural information and advice to individuals and groups who
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maintenance of electricity lines, metering, and billing). Un
want to participate in fonnal PUC proceedings. Under Public
der the new scheme, the traditional local utility-now called
Utilities Code section 309.5, the Office of Ratepayer Advo
a "utility distribution company" (UDC)-will continue to
cates independently represents the interests of all public util
transmit electricity to end users, but generation and some as
ity customers and subscribers in Commission proceedings in
pects of distribution (such as metering and billing) are being
order to obtain "the lowest possible rate for service consis
removed from direct private utility control and placed under
tent with reliable and safe service levels." The Strategic Plan
a competitive format managed by the ISO or the PUC. [ 16: 1
ning Division analyzes emerging policy issues and changes
CRLR 158-62; 15:4 CRLR 234-37]
in the regulatory environment
The new law required an imme
caused by economic, financial,
The new law required an immediate I 0% rate diate 10% rate reduction for residen
institutional, and technological
reduction for residential and small business tial and small business consumers
trends, and helps the Commis
consumers through March 3 1 , 2002, and an
through March 3 1 , 2002, and an "an
sion plan future policy.
"anticipated result" of a "no less than 20%
ticipated result" of a "no less than
Members of the Commis
reduction" in those rates at that point.
20% reduction" in those rates at that
sion currently include PUC
point.
The former has not occurred,
President Richard A. Bilas and
as
explained
below;
and
the
latter
is problematical.
Commissioners Henry M. Duque and Josiah L. Neeper. The
The
electric
rates
of
the
UDCs
are frozen at June 10,
terms of Commissioners Jessie J. Knight and P. Gregory
1996
levels
during
a
"transition
period"
which lasts until each
Conlon expired in early 1999; at this writing, Governor Davis
has
respectively
recovered
all
"uneconomic
generation costs"
has yet to appoint their replacements.
subject to AB 1 890. Many of the utilities have sought to sell
MAJ O R P ROJ ECTS
these assets, or place them in other entities, to end the freeze
expeditiously.
Power Utility Regulation
Unfortunately for the PUC and consumers, the first quar
The PUC continues to implement its precedent-setting
ter of 1999 has been characterized by problems in the new
December 1995 decision to deregulate California's $23 bil
scheme which have failed to yield either the promised rate
decreases or the benefits of competition; utility requests for
lion electricity industry. The PUC intends to maintain regula
tion of the power distribution grid (e.g. , the rights of way and
rate increases and new ratemaking mechanisms under which
wiring which bring power into homes and businesses), but
rates will be set after the transition period; and the PUC's
subject power generation to competition. Hence, maximum
scheduling of a series of fragmented and uncoordinated pro
rate regulation remains in place for the natural monopoly func
ceedings which inherently favors the utility participants.
tion of power distribution, but for functions (such as power
♦ Electrical Service Deregulation Problems Continue.
generation) which can accommodate multiple competitors, a
The use of competition to allocate resources and set prices in
managed competition scheme will allow market forces to
areas outside the (currently) unalterable natural monopoly in
decide entry, allocation and prices.
power transmission has the support of economists and con
In 1996, the California legislature confirmed most of the
sumer advocates. However, the details of California's deregu
PUC's initiative by enacting AB 1 890 (Brulte) (Chapter 854,
lation scheme have raised controversial issues, including the
Statutes of 1996). The statute authorized creation of an "In
following:
• the imposition of a special charge to repay bonds which
dependent System Operator" (ISO) which-effective March
1 , 1998-assumed control of the power grid that transmits
it turns out-is financing the 10% reduction during the
electricity statewide between the respective utilities control
transition period at close to comparable consumer cost in
ling local delivery. A second agency, the Power Exchange
another part of the utility bill;
(PX), functions like a stock exchange, enabling sellers and
• substantial new charges to pay for utilities' uneconomic
buyers to bargain for the best price for electricity. The new
nuclear and other generation facilities which are not vi
law creates governing boards for each of these agencies that
able in a competitive market;
must be "broadly representative of California electricity us
• the inclusion of socially important incentives (e.g., en
ers and providers," and also creates a five-member Oversight
ergy conservation programs, cross-subsidies to assure ba
Board consisting of three gubernatorial appointees subject to
sic heat for the poor or elderly, and programs aimed at
Senate confirmation and two non-voting legislators.
avoiding the depletion of natural resources or the imposi
AB 1 890 authorizes "direct access"-direct transactions
tion of external costs on others from pollution) in a
can occur between electricity suppliers and end use custom
competitive pricing setting which may consider only short
ers without effective interference from the utility carrying the
term profit impact;
electricity. AB 1 890 also outlined a general plan to accom
•
the function of transmitting electricity into homes remains
plish the "unbundling," or separation, of the three distinct
a natural monopoly utility but-instead of subjecting it to
functions of electricity service: ( 1 ) generation, (2) transmis
"fair rate of return" maximum price regulation-the PUC
sion, and (3) distribution (including the unbundling of
1 40

California Regulatory law Reporter ♦ Volume 1 6, No. 2 (Summer 1 999)

B U S I N E S S R E G U L AT O R Y A G E N C I E S

would legislatively mandate the e xisting utility as the default
provider and statutorily lock in many of the advantages cur
rently impeding new entry and competitive choice (see LEG
ISLATION).
After three years, only 37 new ESPs remain of the 300
that initially registered to compete.
♦ Information about Competitive Choice. In order to
stimulate
consumer information about power source choices,
• given the controversial decision to allow utilities trans
private
consumer
groups have started to publish ratings and
mitting power to remain as power generators, the diffi
comparative information. In the
culty in preventing them from
January
1 999 edition of Consumer
favoring their own generated Additio nal factors h ave c o m p l i cated the
Action
News,
the San Francisco
electricity-either throu gh implementation of the new system, including
base
d
group
C onsumer Action
cross-subsidies from their re continued confusion and inertia impeding
published
a
survey
of ESPs, based
maining natural monopoly as consumer and small b usiness use of alter
on
rates
and
terms
of
service. The
sets, or through customer com native power generation, and questionable
results
indicated
available
choices
munications and billing.
marketing practices by some of the newly
at lower prices than are currently
Consumer groups have com a u t h o r i ze d power g e n e rat i o n p rov i d e rs charged by local utilities. Similarly,
plained in particular about the seeking subscribers.
the Utility Consumers' Action Net
publicly-financed bond "bail-out"
work (UCAN), based in San Di
of billions of dollars w orth of uneconomic power-generating
ego, has published detailed comparative information about
assets by ratepayers as the apparent political price of obtain
ESPs, focusing on those promising environmental benefits.
ing utility acquiescence to state deregulation. Proposition 9,
The PUC's 1 999-2000 B usiness Plan acknowledges an
a consumer-sponsored initiative to reverse these and related
agency role in providing consumer education about electric
policies, was defeated during 1 998. [16:1 CRLR 161]
power deregulation to stimulate informed competitive choice.
In November 1 997, the new deregulated system was set
The Consumer Affairs Branch of the Commission's Consumer
for substantial roll-out for an intended transition period last
Services Division (CSD) oversees consumer education pro
ing until April I , 2002, after which the PUC intends full imple
grams designed to alert the c onsumer and facilitate aware
mentation. During 1 998-99, however, the transition has en
ness in competitive markets. CSD works with the PUC's Of
countered complications beyond the five generic objections
fice of Ratepayer Advocates (ORA) to disseminate restruc
listed above. Additional factors have complicated the imple
turing pamphlets through its governmental outreach program.
mentation of the new system, including continued confusion
However, because the information thus far disseminated
and inertia impeding consumer and small business use of al
relates to the PUC process rather than to competitive options,
ternative power generation, and questionable marketing prac
and has not mitigated public confusion, numerous private or
tices by some of the newly-authorized power generation pro
ganizations (e.g., the California Small B usiness Association
viders seeking subscribers.
and the California Small Business Roundtable) have asked
♦ Few Customers Have Switched Electric Service Pro
the PUC to provide its own neutral comparative information,
viders. As of 1 999, PUC statistics show the follow ing per
including a database for comparative pricing on a real-time
centage of customers buying power from new power compa
basis. At this writing, the PUC has yet to respond substan
nies, or "electric service providers" (ESPs) : residentialtively to these requests.
1 .2 %, small commercial-3.4%, _medium commercial♦Alternative Power Providers: Marketing Problems. Re
1 3 . 6%, large industrial-29.3%, and agricultural-6.6%, for
lated to the lack of information problem noted above, the new
a total of 1 2.4%. In certain localities, the switching percentcompetitive marketplace is hampered by unfair marketing
ages are even more tepid; as of
practices and misleading advertis
March 1 999, only 2% of custom- ,-----------.,__------------, ing practices. To the extent these
ers of all types of San Diego Gas Related to the lack of information problem practices undermine the credibil
& Electric Company (SDG&E) noted above, the new competitive market ity of alternative power utility
had switched to any other provider P l ac e i s h a m p ered by u n fa i r marke ti ng claims, they can seriously impede
practices and misleading advertising practices.
(24,000 of 1 .2 million customers)
meritorious new entrants. Where
Consumer advocates contend
consumers are confused or be
that competitive failure is ascribable to market barriers to the
lieve competitive challengers are not accurately describing
new ESPs, the inherent power of consumer inertia, cross-sub
their offerings, the familiar utility name benefits from con
sidies that give UDCs unfair market advantage, and potential
sumer desire to avoid risk
manipulation of PX prices. Consumer groups in particular point
Some of the problems arising in 1 999 are similar to those
to AB 142 1 (Wright), currently pending in the legislature, which
encountered in the PUC's regulation of new telecommunication
will implement "performance-based ratemaking" (PBR),
which calculates rates from existing levels while allow
ing the utility to share the gain from cost savings above
normally allowed profit. PBR is criticized by consumer
groups as an opportunity for accounting gamesmanship
to achieve an effectively unmonitored excessive rate of
return; and

California Regulatory Law Reporter ♦ Volume 16, No. 2 (Summer 1999)

141

B U S I N E S S R E G U L AT O RY A G E N C I E S
competitors. Initial marketing abuses acknowledged by the PUC
include "slamming" (the illegal switching of consumers by an
ESP to its account), "cramming" (billing for additional services
not requested), "bait and switch" (attracting customers with cheap
service, followed by the substitution of a more expensive and
profitable arrangement), high-pressure sales techniques, and long
term contracts that lock customers into a static price notwith
standing possible price declines due to future competition.
The form of the electric utility bill mandated by SB 477
(Peace) (Chapter 275, Statutes of 1 997) requires an itemiza
tion (the "unbundled" breakdown ofall of the separate charges
that go into the kilowatt/hour rate). [ 1 6: 1 CRLR 1 60J These
itemized disclosures allow a consumer to see more clearly
the savings which may come from a new power generator.
The utility bill must include the following separate compo
nents: ( 1 ) the state-mandated 1 0% reduction, (2) the charge
for electric energy (the UDC' s cost of buying power from the
PX); (3) the transmission charge, (4) the distribution charge,
(5) the "public purpose programs" assessment (e.g., for low
income ratepayer assistance and alternate energy sources de
velopment), (6) a nuclear decommissioning charge, (7) the
"competition transition charge" (CTC) (a state-authorized
charge against ratepayers enabling utilities to recoup their
investments in uneconomic power plants), and (8) the "trust
transfer amount" (TIA) (the cost of the bonds that are fi
nancing the state-mandated 1 0% "reduction" which assisted
the passage of the deregulation statute). The controversial CTC
and TIA are nearing payoff in 1 999.
PUC Decision 98-03-072 implemented other consumer
protection mandates of SB 477. It requires ESP registration
with the PUC, which in turn requires proof of financial vi
ability, proof of technical and operational abilities, security
deposit or financial guarantee bond, and extensive background
information on managers, directors, and officers. Each ESP
is required to provide a copy of all of its agreements with its
scheduling coordinators (entities that schedule deliveries of
the ESP's power to the ISO-controlled power grid), or decla
rations from each scheduling coordinator with which the ESP
has an agreement. Each ESP is also required to submit a copy
of its notice of terms and conditions. Public Utilities Code
subsections 394(a)(9) and ( 1 0) contain the standards for proof
of financial viability and proof of technical operational abil
ity, respectively.
However, the PUC's implementation of this marketing
protection effort focuses on viability and performance, simi
lar to the regulatory concerns of the Insurance Commissioner
in ensuring that companies receiving premiums will be able
to pay claims. Consumer groups have urged the agency to
turn its attention to the marketing abuses listed above, to use
its rulemaking powers for preventive purposes, and to en
gage in licensure discipline against violators.
♦ "Green Power" Claims. Consumer groups have red
flagged for the PUC one particular marketing abuse: the pos
sibly misleading use of environmental advantage claims. To
be certified to use a "Green-e" logo, a power company must
1 42

certify that: ( I ) at least 50% of its electricity is generated
using renewable resources; (2) any nonrenewable part of the
product has lower air emissions than the traditional mix of
electricity; and (3) the company agrees to undergo an annual
audit to verify its purchases of renewable energy. The certifi
cation process is supported by the California Energy Com
mission (CEC), which gives a 1 .5-cent-per-kilowatt/hour cus
tomer rebate for qualified customers. Under a separate pro
gram, the legislature allocated $54 million to help install pho
tovoltaic cells and other types of emerging renewable tech
nologies; this is a small allocation.
A "green power" label has powerful advertising appeal,
but environmental and consumer groups contend that the cur
rent tracking and certificate systems are inadequate and may
mislead consumers, noting that most companies that have
survived in the green power market are subsidiaries of exist
ing electric companies that focus on profiting from non-green
sources.
♦ Complicated Rate Proceedings Initiated. On January
1 5, 1 999, all three major utilities (SDG&E, Pacific Gas &
Electric (PG&E), and Southern California Edison (SCE)) filed
applications for the establishment of post-"transition period"
rates. Although the statute sets an April 1 , 2002 outside date
for termination of the transition period (as well as the rate
freeze), it does not preclude earlier transition completion.
These proceedings will decide important rate design fea
tures, including treatment of the controversial power "cost
recovery" accounts, and exactly how the PUC's novel "per
formance-based ratemaking" (PBR) will work in a part mo
nopoly/part competitive deregulated setting. The Commis
sion has created two phases to make these seminal decisions:
Phase 1 will consider when and how to end the rate freeze,
while Phase 2 will decide post-transition rate regulation.
The following schedules have been adopted. In Phase 1 ,
ORA must file its direct testimony by March 30; any interve
nors i n the proceedings must file their opening testimony by
April 1 8; the utilities' rebuttal testimony is due by April 29;
the hearings before a PUC ALJ begin on May 1 O; after the
hearings have concluded, opening briefs are due on June 1 ;
the ALJ's proposed decision is scheduled for July 5 ; and the
PUC's final decision is scheduled for August 5. In Phase 2,
ORA must file its direct testimony by July 2; any intervenors
in the proceedings must file their opening testimony by July
30; the utilities' rebuttal testimony is due by August 1 1 ; the
hearings before a PUC ALJ are scheduled to begin on August
23; after the hearings have concluded, opening briefs are due
on September 25; the ALJ's proposed decision is scheduled
for December 14; and the PUC's final decision is scheduled
for January 1 4, 2000.
The new PBR methodology rejects the traditional "fair
rate of return" on equity concept historically applied to mo
nopoly utilities. Instead, the rate structure is intended to share
cost savings from enhanced efficiencies achieved by the util
ity, just as the marketplace rewards those who outperform their
competitors with a higher rate of return. Critics point to the
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stakeholders participating as a prelude to evidentiary hear
"Catch-22" problem of starting with current costs (which
ings before the Commission.
may be the product of inefficiencies) and the failure to cal
In their ruling dated March 1 , PUC ALJs Malcolm and
culate the traditional rate of return on used and useful eq
Minkin consolidated SDG&E's rate increase request with its
uity. Consumer advocates generally favor augmenting the
post-transition period PBR application. At a March 1 2
fair rate of return system to provide incentives to improve,
prehearing conference, the parties were encouraged to meet
but argue that rejection of the fair rate of return calculation
and resolve the issues on an interim basis. The parties filed a
of prudent costs plus a fair rate of return on invested capital
proposed settlement on April 1 5 ; hearings on the settlement
invites abuse. The regulator will not know precisely how
occurred on April 20 and, at this writing, a decision is ex
much of an incentive over market "return on investment"
pected before the end of May.
levels is being provided.
♦ Performance-Based Ratemaking. Separate from the
This problem has crystallized with the utilities' proposal
above, all three utilities have filed proceedings pursuant to
to apply PBR to their "electric procurement" decisions.
the present PBR system in place during the transition period.
Traditionally, under fair rate of return review, costs must be
These proceedings are complicated by their interaction with
"prudent" if assessed against ratepayers, and capital acquisi
post-transition proceedings, and by their fragmentation into
tion must be "used and useful" to allow a return on the in
vested funds which financed it. Consumer groups contend that
stages or parts.
utilities are now attempting to profit from naturally occurring
♦ Revenue Adjustment Proceedings. In addition, all three
efficiencies from outside technology and expanded volume.
utilities will apply for their first annual revenue adjustments
That is, with high fixed plant costs, business volume increases
allowed under the new statute. Revenue requirements are to
allow more efficient use of that large plant-unit costs decline · be adjusted annually, involving a review of the accounting
as plant utilization improves. Such factors have little to do with
methods used for each. In addition, the proceedings may "con
utility performance, and the marketplace would not reward them
sider rate design and revenue allocation issues," although the
were it functioning normally. Hence, the purpose of PBR-to
proceedings under way (discussed above) would limit their
provide an incentive to enhance efficiency and performance as
significance.
does a competitive market-does not apply.
♦ Annual Transition Cost Proceedings. Complicating
further the rate determinations of the power utilities are an
♦ SDG&E Folds Rate Increase Request Into Post
Freeze Methodology Proceedings. As of early 1 999, SDG&E
nual rate adjustments during the term of the "transition" pe
contends that it has recovered its uneconomic generation costs,
riod (potentially up to April 1 , 2002) based primarily on cost
and has applied for termination of its transition period. If
changes. On September 1 , 1 998, PG&E, SCE, and SDG&E
granted, both the rate freeze and the CTC would terminate.
filed their first applications for this annual review. The pur
SDG&E is expected to achieve such transition termination
pose of these "annual transition cost proceedings" is to ad
eligibility in May 1 999. Anticipating release from the rate
j ust the "transition cost balancing account" as new develop
freeze, SDG&E has applied for a post-transition rate increase,
ments require. In other words, the PUC will adjust the utility
to be effective on July 1 , 1 999. Esportion of consumers' bill given
sentially, SDG&E is proposing to
the costs and revenues from the
Anticipating release from the rate fre eze,
replace the temporary CTC with
new ISO and PX agencies now
SDG&E has applied for a post-transition rate
a permanent rate increase. David
arranging for competitive choice.
increase, to be effective on July I , 1 999. Essen
Fukutome, ORA project supervi
Adj ustments must be made as
tially, SDG&E is proposing to replace the tem
sor, calculates the allocation o f
costs change, as the utilities sell
porary CTC with a permanent rate increase.
transition paymen t revenues
many of their powerplants (which
through the course o f the 20
necessarily affects depreciation
months of SDG&E's transition period (September 1 997 to
accounts), as contracts are bought out and employees are
May 1999) as follows: utility shareholders $ 1 42 million,
shifted, and as other changes occur.
ratepayers $7 million. Hence, funds collected from this ac
The current schedule for these proceedings (for all three
count have not ended up paying for costs incurred from com
utilities) is as follows: ORA will file initial direct testimony
petition-related change, but have ended up as extra profit for
by April 20; by May 7, the Workshop Report on Rate Reduc
utility stockholders. SDG&E contends that long-term alter
tion Bond Issues will be issued; by May 1 1 , intervenor testi
native-energy contracts and long-term power purchase con
mony must be filed; hearings will begin by June 2 1 ; the pro
posed ALJ decision is expected by November 1 6; and the
tracts explain the need for continuing CTC charges after the
legislative rate cap ends.
PUC's final decision is expected by December 1 6.
UCAN submitted briefs in the case, objecting to the pro
These proceedings are particularly important to the ex
tent they establish precedents which may influence the post
cedural tactics of SDG&E (failure to consolidate proceed
ings to allow effective ratepayer presentation; failure to seek
transition permanent rate mechanism discussed above.
information or views outside the utility). UCAN recom
♦ PG&E Transitional Rate Increase Request Particu
mends a series of PUC-ordered workshops, with all interested
larly High. Of particular note is PG&E's request for a rate
California Regulatory Law Reporter ♦ Volume 16, No. 2 (Summer 1999)
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"revenue cycle unbundling" is the PUC's term for "metering,
increase which would apply during the transition period.
billing, and related services." "Unbundling" is its term for
PG&E seeks to increase rates by $ 1 .2 billion beginning in
separating out those activities from the existing utilities' ser
1 999. The proposal would raise average natural gas bills by
vices to allow competitive choice. One motivation for this
25% and electric bills by 30%. PG&E based its estimates on
unbundling may be to end possible utility favoritism for its
its highest base year costs ( 1 996), and reasoned that the high
own power generation. Another rationale is to dispel some of
rates are needed because of the revised economy, customer
the confusion for consumers who
growth, and desire for greater
reliability. On April 20, ORA Of particular note is PG&E's request for a rate are told there is competitive
countered with a recommended increase w h ich w o u l d apply d u ring the choice, but who continue to re
increase of between $ 1 00-$200 transition period. PG&E seeks to increase ceive bills and have their meters
read by the existing utility. Given
million-approximately 1 0% of rates by $ 1 .2 billion beginning in 1 999.
the possibility of electronic transthe amount requested. ORA pro
mission of meter levels showing
duced studies indicating that
electricity or gas use, the previous economy of scale of hav
PG&E is not operating its system efficiently, and has cited
ing a single meter reader from one company ride a route house
reductions of base margins by other utilities.
to house may no longer apply. But to accomplish multiple
UCAN, TURN, and other consumer groups contend that
firm functioning, the PUC must allow "open architecture"
the legislative promises of a 1 0% immediate rate reduction
and a 20% subsequent reduction at the conclusion of the tran
and multiple access to such information. At the same time,
that opening up raises issues of accuracy, unilateral di version
sition period will be "honored in the breach." Notwithstand
ing the bail-out of the uneconomic power generation facili
of customers to a company without consumer consent, cost
ties of all three utilities, PG&E in particular seeks not de
shifting from one group of customers to favored customers
creases, but substantial increases above inflation. At this writ
with bargaining power (e.g. , residential to large industrial),
ing, a decision is expected from ALI Wetzell in November,
and accountability for meter or billing errors. These decisions
consistent with the scheduled decisions above for all three
begin the process of pricing these services, and their man
utilities.
agement in a possible "unbundled" competitive environment.
♦ Competition Transition Charge (CTC) Proceedings.
The UNIS decision is related to this effort, providing an iden
Finally, a separate set of proceedings considering the adequacy
tifying label or number to every service delivery point on an
of the CTC is indicative of the fragmentation problem in cur
electric utility's distribution system, allowing its proper iden
rent PUC rate proceedings. In A.96-08-00 1 , a transition cost
tification between multiple providers. Hence, the same label
proceeding is addressing CTC terms and conditions in two
will be available to identify power to a given home by the
phases and over what has been, thus far, five decisions. On
electric utility delivering the power, and a possibly separate
December 17, 1 998, the Commission issued D.98- 1 2-067,
power generating company providing it, as well as a possibly
relating to CTC charges allowed as to "new customer" loads
separate meter reading and billing company. The utilities are
(see Public Utilities Code section 369).
given until May 1 999 to develop and assign a numbering/
As to the CTC charge allowed for Southern California
identification system consistent with its specifications.
Edison, ORA and intervenor testimony have been filed, hear
Telecommunications Utility Regulation
ings were conducted from October 2 1 to November 3, 1 998,
Telecommunications deregul ati on has preceded
and a final decision is due before the end of June 1 999. As to
SDG&E and PG&E, settlement proposals were reached with
California's electricity deregulation by several decades. The
parties in consolidated proceedings by November 3, 1 998;
seminal 1 982 consent decree in United States v. AT& T divested
hearings on the agreements were held in January 1 999; and
the defendant of its existing national telephone monopoly,
the settlements are now final.
spinning out the so-called "Baby Bells" to substantial regula
♦ Unbundling and Direct Access Continues. The PUC
tion by state public utilities commissions, and introducing com
seeks to facilitate direct access between competitors and con
petitive choice in long distance service, telephone equipment
sumers wherever feasible. The agency also continues to sepa
manufacture, inside wiring of homes, and other aspects of
telephone service then subject to AT&T control.
rate out business activities not required for the natural mo
The decision has meant greater efficiency, enhanced tech
nopoly "delivery loop" of wires into homes and businesses.
nological advances, and lower prices, but has produced many
In three separate decisions in late 1 998, the PUC voted 5-0 to
approve "revenue cycle unbundling," a "universal node iden
of the regulatory problems now being encountered in elec
tifier system" (UNIS), and "permanent standards for meter
tricity deregulation, as described above. The role of the PUC
has been to regulate Pacific Bell's (PacBell) provision of lo
ing and metering data," respectively. These three decisions
cal telephone service, and to otherwise act under FCC guide
affect PG&E, SCE, and SDG&E.
lines as a kind of "competition manager" (which the PUC's
Although jargon-rich, these proceedings open the way
ten-year business plan terms "a referee in a multi-player en
for competition in billing and meter reading by specifying
standards to allow more than one firm to participate. The term
vironment"). The developing problems include many of those
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specify an exclusive Internet service provider (ISP) through
which attend vigorous competition: marketing abuses, mis
which all cable-accessed communications to the Internet must
leading advertising, and allegations of price discrimination
traverse. However, the City of Portland has attempted to re
or unfair practices by the Baby B ells that retain monopoly
quire AT&T, its cable franchisee, to grant access to the Internet
power over the so-called "local loop" (the wires bringing
via any ISP selected by the consumer. That provision is con
phone service into homes and businesses). Problems also in
sistent with the deregulation thesis that monopoly power
clude the maintenance of cross-subsidies considered socially
should be confined as narrowly as possible to the natural
beneficial (such as universal service and aid for the disabled)
monopoly aspect of a line of commerce. AT&T argues that
in a manner which is "competitively neutral."
Portland lacks the authority to impose such a requirement.
Three factors distinguish evolving telephone regulation
Most troubling to consumer advocates has been the posture
from its electricity counterpart. First, federal (Federal Com
of the FCC, which now contends that ( I ) it may have exclu
munications Commission) jurisdiction versus state PUC ju
sive
jurisdiction over the Internet and (2) if so, it sides with
risdiction remains somewhat unclear and has been subject to
AT&T
and endorses its right to require exclusive control over
the federal Telecommunications Act of 1 996.
access to the Internet information marketplace. The issue has
Second, the introduction of cable competition has com
been joined in Portland v. AT&T, now pending in the U.S.
plicated the picture, including imminent cable-based interac
Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
tive voice communications. The cable industry is not subject
The
eventual impact of these developments on the PUC
to state PUC jurisdiction. On February 22, Consumers Union
should be significant. Its constitutional charge is to regulate
(CU)-the nation's ·largest and most respected consumer or
monopoly utilities. If the federal courts affirm local jurisdic
ganization-issued;a 53-page report entitled The Digital Di
tion over cable through franchise agreements, then the statevide Confronts the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The re
as sovereign-may specify to lo
port points out that, under the
1 996 Act, the cable_'television in Since cable providers are unregulated and face cal governments what must be in
dustry will begin to.enjoy "a mar little competition from other cable providers those agreements, and monopoly
ketplace environment that has ab in their respective r e l evant ge ographic pow er abu ses may thus b e
solutely no controls-on its pricing markets, they possess effective monopoly checked, even if neglectful fed
for anything other than broadcast control of Internet access, as well as cable eral policies continue. Hence, the
state may then fashion a role for
channels" (i.e. , basic service) on service provision itself.
the PUC in the regulation of cable
March 3 1 , 1 999. Very few homes
franchise arrangements, which have historically been drafted
receive only basic service, and the cable industry now calls
in boilerplate fashion by attorneys for the cable industry.
the more advanced and unregulated levels of service "basic."
Beyond the cable regulatory vacuum, with its Internet
The report points out that even before this change, cable tele
access and first amendment implications, the PUC is affected
vision rates have been increasing at more than four times the
by cable because of its increasing competitive posture vis-a
inflation rate. CU recommended a series of reforms to regu
vis the telephone industry, where it exercises substantial ju
late the cable monopoly in lieu of the absent marketplace,
risdiction . The telephone industry finds itself bound by regu
and also covered the changing long distance and local phone
latory constrictions not applicable to its new intermodal
markets in its analysis.
competitor. For example, it has long been FCC and local PUC
The third and related new development is the advent of
policy that telephone companies must allow Internet access
the Internet as a forum for both free speech and commerce.
via any competent ISP chosen by the consumer.
The now unregulated cable mode currently allows continu
Similarly, new competition is emerging within the tele
ous access to the Internet at much higher speeds than most
phone industry itself. The l ocal exchange carriers (LECs) are
telephone-based connections. Since cable providers are un
now expected by the FCC to allow competition for "toll" calls,
regulated and face little competition from other cable provid
as well as the long distance calls n ow subject to competition.
ers in their respective relevant geographic markets, they pos
As the LECs seek to enter into the long distance market them
sess effective monopoly control of lnternet access, as well as
selves as competitors, they are now instructed by the FCC
cable service provision itself.
that this permission is conditioned on toll call competition.
The anticompetitive structure of cable has led to contro
versy in late 1 998 and 1 999, as AT&T has entered the cable
The LECs note that their competitors for long distance provi
sion have n o such restrictions and object to the lack of a level
market, merging with and buying cable assets to the point
playing field, which is allegedly the goal of deregulation.
that it now has a substantial interest in the providers reaching
♦ PacBell Entry into Long Distance Dependent Upon
most U .S. homes with cable service. The only remaining and
Toll Call Competition. In early 1 998, PacBell applied to the
limited regulation remaining for cable occurs via the fran
chise agreements that each cable provider must sign with the
PUC to become a long distance provider ("interLATA car
cities and counties (local governments) whose rights of way
rier") within California pursuant to section 271 of the federal
Telecommunications Act of 1 996. Section 27 1 of the 1 996
their lines must traverse. AT&T contends that, in addition to
Act permits Baby B ells to enter the long distance market, so
possessing a cable monopoly in a given community, it can
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consumer groups contend that PacBell has succeeded in rais
long as they can prove that they have opened their respective
ing other barriers to competitive challenge (such as the extra
local exchange markets to competition. To meet this require
dialing per call problem), such that little competition has oc
ment, a local Bell must demonstrate that it has complied with
curred or is likely, and the extra charge therefor represents
a 1 4-point "competitive checklist" and that "the requested
not a cost imposed because of number portability needs, but
authorization is consistent with the public interest, conve
is simply a windfall for the utility.
nience, and necessity." In December 1 998, the PUC issued a
♦ PacBell Nationwide Listing Service. In October 1 998,
decision finding that PacBell has not yet fully opened its lo
PacBell filed Advice Letter No. 1 9795 seeking to establish a
cal market to competition. According to the Commission,
Nationwide Listing Service (NLS). The NLS would allow
PacBell has complied with only four of the required fourteen
customers to dial 4 1 1 and ask not just for local directory as
points on the checklist.
sistance, but for directory assistance nationwide. The charge
Meanwhile, the B aby Bells-including PacBell-have
initially would be 95 cents per request (whether or not the
been seeking a court judgment eliminating the federal Act's
number is found), with a ceiling of $ 1 .05. This effort is an
requirement that they open up local phone service to compe
tition before they can enter long
opening wedge into long distance
distance service within states, or
service provision, and produced
between states. However, i n The Baby Bells-including PacBell-have been immediate protests from MCI
March 1 998, the U.S. Court of seeking a court judgment e l i m i n ating the Communications that it cannot be
Appeals for the District of Colum federal Act's requirement that they open up allowed without compliance with
bia Circuit ruled in SBC Commu local phone service to competition before they the 1 996 Act's requirement to
nications v. FCC, 1 3 8 F.3d 4 1 0 can enter long distance service within states, open up local competition, which
(D.C. Cir. 1 998), that the FCC or between states.
it alleged PacBell has failed to do
could require the Baby Bells to
(see above). TURN, a San Fran
cisco-based consumer group, protested the charge where no
open up their local phone markets (e. g., intrastate toll call
competition) before they are allowed to compete for long dis
listing is found, and also questioned whether the "below the
tance services. That local competition facilitation depends
line" financing of the charge is appropriate. That is, if the
upon state PUC facilitation. And on January 1 9, the U.S. Su
revenues from these charges do not pay for the nationwide
preme Court denied review of a similar holding by the Fifth
directory service, should all ratepayers subsidize its net cost?
Circuit (see LITIGATION).
If the costs are allowed "below the line," that is the effect.
Notwithstanding these cases, PacBell reapplied to the
That possibility could result in the use of PacBell 's current
PUC in February 1 999 for authority to enter the long dis
monopoly power from ratepayer assessment (where it retains
tance market. PacBell argued that GTE (and other long dis
monopoly power) to give it an unfair advantage in this long
tance competitors which are not B aby Bell spin-offs) are able
distance-related service, giving it a competitive advantage in
to offer their subscribers competitive intrastate toll call ser
long distance carriage against MCI and others who do not
vices separate from PacBell ; in other words, there is viable
have that assured revenue stream and cross-subsidy source.
local competition in California. Although the FCC does not
In response, PacBell agreed that the service would be
consider existing non-PacBell choices to be real competition
"above the line," meaning that if it is not compensatory, ad
(because PacBell remains the default carrier, and any com
ditional funds would come from profits (i.e., stockholders)
petitor must require the dialing of a special code before each
rather than from ratepayers subject to monopoly power. With
call to receive credit for carrying it), PacBell contends that
that major alteration, the PUC adopted Resolution T- 1 6288
the California PUC's more liberal guidelines apply within the
on April 22, approving the new charge and service. Its ap
state. The PUC must decide during 1 999-2000 whether or
proval signals substantially greater support of PacBell 's en
how it will arrange for more competitive local toll call condi
try i nto long distance competition from the PUC than is cur
tions, or whether the utility will eschew long distance entry.
rently extant at the FCC.
One of the most difficult aspects of local competition is
♦ Rulemaking and Surcharges to Support Universal
Telephone Service Goals. In September 1 998, the PUC
the need for "number portability"-that is, the ability of con
opened a rulemaking proceeding to consider modifying
sumers to keep their existing phone numbers if they shift to
California's Universal Lifeline Telephone Service (ULTS)
another local carrier. As of February 1 999, the PUC autho
rized PacBell to charge 50 cents per month per line to finance
Program and General Order (GO) 1 53. The ULTS program
what it contends will be its cost to provide number portabil
was initially created to implement the 1 983 Moore Universal
Telephone Service Act, which provides low-income house
ity if customers shift to another local carrier. Although UCAN
holds with access to basic telephone service at a discounted
and other consumer groups have complained, PacBell con
rate (generally 50% lower). The cost of the ULTS program is
tends that the charge is merely a "pass-through" cost and that
currently $245 million, and it serves 3. 1 million subscribers.
the general financing of this cost by the entire system allows
Local phone companies recover the costs of providing ULTS
it to facilitate competition as consumers can switch more con
from rates paid by ULTS phone customers, subsidies from
veniently, as the FCC pro-competition policy commends. The
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federal universal service programs, and subsidies from the
ULTS program. ULTS program costs are funded by the ULTS
surcharge all customers pay on their intrastate charges. [ 16: 1
CRLR 163]
The modifications to be considered would update the
1 984 GO 1 5 3 (which defines the procedures for administer
ing the program) to reflect ULTS program changes, make
ULTS conform to similar federal programs, foster competi
tion in providing ULTS, and require telecommunications pro
viders to follow uniform ULTS procedures.
The Telecommunications Act of 1 996 supports continua
tion of universal service cross-subsidies. Modifying California's
ULTS program to conform to federal standards will enable
ULTS customers to get discounted installation charges when
ever they move to different residences. It will also give them
the option of a deferred payment schedule for installation
charges, enable them to receive toll calling control services
without charge, and prohibit disccnnection of an ULTS cus
tomer for non-payment of toll charges. Other proposed ULTS
program modifications would enable all local phone service
providers to recover their costs of providing ULTS service to
the extent they are not reimbursed from the federal Lifeline
and Link Up programs, and allow ULTS subscribers to pay
discounted installation charges once per year when switching
ULTS providers. The uniform procedures proposed in the
rulemaking are intended to reduce ULTS program administra
tive costs and ensure that all carriers are treated equally and
fairly. At this writing, the proceeding is scheduled to be con
cluded with Commission action by September 1 999.
The Commission is coextensively considering specific
surcharges necessary to support related universal service
goals. Current surcharge rates are based on Resolutions T1 6234, T- 1 6242, T-1 6244, T- 1 6245, and T- 1 6 1 65 in Decem
ber 1 998 . The pending September 1 999 decision from ALJ
Kenney may adjust these surcharges. In addition to assisting
low-income consumers (as described above), these funds also
help certain small independent telephone companies serving
rural areas, and provide equipment for deaf and disabled con
sumers. The last account operates on a 1 999 budget of $52
million for the Deaf and Disabled Telecommunications Equip
ment and Service Programs pursuant to Public Utilities Code
section 288 1 . The new rates to be authorized in September
will likely take effect on November 1 , 1 999.
♦ Running Out of Numbers: The Area Code Prolifera
tion Problem. New technology has generated a need for mul
tiple lines into homes and businesses. Consumers increas
ingly have one line for the traditional phone, one for the fax,
one for the Internet, and one or more for cellular phone con
nections. Further complicating the picture, the state has 1 90
competitive local phone companies and 56 wireless firms, all
of which need to assign numbers. Numbers are assigned in
blocks of 1 0,000 per rate center, with 800 such centers now
in the state. As the numbering is now constituted, a new car
rier seeking to offer its own services to unique numbers would
have to find eight million numbers to begin service.

Adding these new lines beyond normal population growth
means that numbers are used up; new neighborhood and then
new area code numbers must be created. Each such alteration
means substantial costs for residences, and especially for
businesses which rely on telephone traffic. California has
opened 25 area codes and will require 1 6 more by the end of
2002 at present growth rates.
AB 8 1 8 (Knox), as amended on April 28, would require
policies aimed at preventing unnecessary area code alterations
by ordering the PUC to seek authority from the FCC to use
more numbers and to give the PUC greater flexibility (see
LEGISLATION). The PUC, which does not require legisla
tive approval to seek such authority, issued a press release on
April 26 announcing that it is seeking an "FCC waiver on
number allocations to help check area code proliferation."
The waiver seeks authority to assign an area code to more
than one technology or service (opening the way, perhaps,
for cable telephony). The Knox bill also requires that new
numbers be assigned to prefixes t hat are more than 25% used
and prohibits assignment to area codes less than 25% used
until numbers are otherwise unavailable. In other words,
PacBell could not open up new area codes until its existing
numbers are at capacity. PacBell opposes this measure as re
stricting its flexibility, and impeding its ability to anticipate
the need for new area codes in advance of absolute need.
More substantively, in December 1 998 the PUC insti
tuted rulemaking on "Area Code Relief' (R.98-12-01 4). Cur
rent policy is guided by D.96-08-028, which requires a man
datory " 1 + 1 0" number system (I , plus three-digit area code,
plus seven-digit number) to be in place, and "full number
portability" (as discussed above) . Hence, if there is an area
code change, the underlying seven-digit number must remain.
In 96- 12-086, the Commission decided that geographic splits
(the splitting of an existing area code and designation of part
under a new area code) must cause "the fewest negative im
pacts to consumers." Except for the Los Angeles 3 1 0 area
code, all others must be split under the format described above.
The decision al so requires a twelve-month warning prior to
implementation. Meanwhile, the FCC has been imposing its
own requirements, including a 90-day period after a new code
is in place during which a misdialed number will trigger a
message explaining that a new area code applies and direct
ing the caller to dial it (FCC Order 96-333).
The PUC's rulemaking is considering four policy options:
( 1 ) mandatory use of overlays for all new area codes; (2)
mandatory use of overlays for specific regions only; (3) man
datory geographic splits; or (4) a case-by-case approach. As
noted above, in a "split" of an existing area code, a new num
ber is created for part of the existing area code; those fortu
nate to be in the territory whose area code remains unchanged
do not alter their dialing practices at all. All persons dial seven
numbers within their area codes in the old and in the new
area code territories, respectively. They dial three extra num
bers to reach another area code. However, under the "over
lay" option, an area code i s added to a geographic area; both
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the new overlay area code and the existing code serve the
same area simultaneously, and everyone dials eleven num
bers ( 1 + 1 0) to reach everyone, no matter where geographi
cally. Needless to say, this option has not been popular with
consumers. However, it has been adjudicated for the Bay Area
starting in 2000 (see discussion below).
The rationale behind the overlay option is to begin the
process of an eleven-number system, thus opening up all the
numbers in area codes which are not heavily used. The Com
mission believes that the proliferation of new area codes
means that an increasing number of calls now have to be made
by entering 1 + 1 0 numbers anyway. Indeed, i n urban areas, a
call more than ten to fifteen miles away may now require a I
+ 1 0 dial. Hence, the PUC believes that popular opposition
may be declining for 1 1 numbers as a regular format. Many
consumers disagree.
While this overarching rulemaking proceeds, the PUC
continues to review specific numbering plans. On April 26,
AU Pulsifier approved an overlay relief plan for the 650 num
bering plan covering parts of San Mateo and Santa Clara coun
ties (R. 95-04-043, 1.95-04-044). The 650 area code was cre
ated when the 4 1 5 Bay Area code was split in 1 997. It was
projected to last until 2009, but is now projected to fill up by
the third quarter of 2001 . Much of the new competition in the
local exchange market which has occurred is in this geographic
area, and is one reason for the exhaustion of numbers.
Significantly, this decision for the first time will require
all subscribers to use 1 + 1 0 dialing to reach another number,
including one nearby. There will be no seven-number short
cut within the area. The decision is based on the policy of
allowing competition, and the need to put all competitors on
an even playing field. If PacBell customers are allowed to
dial seven numbers but competitors must dial eleven, they
suffer a disadvantage which impedes competitive challenge.
Hence, because there is not room for all providers, especially
with number portability, at the seven-number range, all must
use eleven. This is the "overlay" model referred to above. At
this writing, the new plan is proposed to begin on September
1 6, 2000 i n San Mateo and Santa Clara.
♦ Telecommunications Standards Proceedings: Market
ing Abuses. In June 1 998, the PUC initiated a rulemaking
proceeding "to determine the types of service quality stan
dards that should be applicable to telecommunications carri
ers" (R.98-06-029). The effort is intended to ensure "that high
levels of service quality will prevail" as competition takes
hold. The PUC's inquiry follows General Order (GO) 1 33-B.
Last revised in 1 992, GO 1 33-B was issued "prior to the dra
matic growth in consumer demand for additional telecom
munications services and lines to customers' premises, and
prior to all but the earliest stages of competition develop
ment." GO 1 33-B is applicable to all telephone utilities pro
viding service within California; these utilities compile ser
vice quality data on a monthly basis and report to the PUC on
a quarterly basis when any reporting unit does not meet the
specified service level criteria for any month.
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The Commission noted that the number of service qual
ity complaints regarding telephone service made to its staff
almost doubled between 1 996 and 1 997; for this same pe
riod, complaints relating to missed commitments increased
from 30 to 502, while complaints related to delayed installa
tions increased from 1 7 1 to 703. "It is the purpose of this
rulemaking to propose for comment a set of service quality
standards and compliance mechanisms intended to address
these and other service quality problems and set minimal stan
dards for all customers." In July 1 998, the assignedALJ agreed
to requests from consumer advocates and telephone compa
nies to hold a two-day workshop on the issues, and to extend
the deadline for briefs and comments. [16: 1 CRLR 164J
On March 29, UCAN submitted testimony in the
rulemaking proceeding recommending standards and report
ing requirements applicable to all competitors (not merely
Pac Bell), and which provide for the counting of busy signal
calls as one measure of quality. UCAN similarly advocated
calculating time expended in navigating the automatic re
sponse unit phones. UCAN's submission surveyed related
service industry quality standards for possible application to
telecommunications, including banks which are prohibited
from deductions for purchases not made or other errors, in
cluding timelines for correction, and the two-day limitation
on the holding of local checks. UCAN also cites bill collec
tors, who are limited in their methods by federal and state
law, credit card regulation, and other precedents which have
some applicability, in terms of abuse and possible prophylac
tic standards, to telephone service. At this writing, the pro
ceeding remains pending.
Related investigative proceedings have continued (R.9708-001 , I. 97-08-002) directed at the specific and well-docu
mented abuses of "slamming" and "cramming." Hence, in June
1 998, the PUC's Telecommunications Division released its
Workshop and Third Party Compliance Report concerning
"Unauthorized Transfer of Service and B illing." Called "slam
ming," new competitors simply shift a consumer's account to
themselves without consumer permission, and begin billing.
The new procedure now requires the transfer of a new account
to be accompanied by "third party verification" that the con
sumer has consented to it. D.98-02-009 now requires such veri
fication to address these "slamming" (and the related "cram
ming") abuses. The workshop report indicates substantial com
pliance with the order, but the problem continues; hence, staff
recommends additional measures, including most importantly:
( 1 ) revoking the licenses of offenders, (2) expansion of the
third-party verification to business (as well as residential) so
licitations, (3) apart from verification, i nforming consumers
when they have been switched, and (4) removal of the eco
nomic incentive for slamming (although it is unclear how). Staff
also recommends disclosure of both the PUC's complaint num
ber and its local service disconnect policy.
♦ PacBell Seeks Substantial Increase in Service
Charges. In May 1 998, PacBell applied to the PUC for rate
increases on several services which remain within PacBell's
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monopoly power and the Commission's rate regulation pur
view. Under the proposed rate hikes, emergency interruption
charges would increase from $ 1 to $4; busy line verification
from 50 cents to $2; directory assistance from 25 cents to 50
cents, with an option to raise the rate to $ 1 . 1 O; calling card
calls from 35 cents to 60 cents; collect and bill-to-third-num
ber calls from 95 cents to $ 1 .60; person-to-person calls from
$2.95 to $4; and inside wiring charges from 60 cents per month
to $ 1 .50 (A 98-05-038).
The PUC held public hearings on these proposed rate
increases in several cities in late 1 998, and evidentiary hear
ings on December 1 998. PacBell argued that no significant
rate hikes for these services have been imposed for several
years, and that they are justified by labor cost increases. Con
sumer advocates countered that the increasing use of tech
nology should more than offset increases in labor and that
consumers should be given a rate rollback. Briefs were sub
mitted in January and February 1 999, and a proposed deci
sion is expected by September 1 999.
♦ Other Pending Rate-Related Proceedings. A series of
additional proceedings may relate to PacBell prices under the
new and fragmented method of utility ratesetting.
• PacBell and Price Caps. On January 20, the PUC
adopted Resolution T- 1 6265, ordering PacBell to reduce its
annual revenue by $244 million effective in February 1 999,
consistent with the utility's price cap index. Note that maxi
mum rate regulation always sets rates based on revenue and
cost factors from existing numbers projected forward. They
are subject to necessary review and revision as the actual num
bers appear. The new incentive-based ratemaking projects
ratios forward from.previous levels to measure whether rev
enue is too high or low, and allowing efficiency gains (per
unit cost reductions) to be shared by the utility. The process
uses terminology such as "net Z-factor adjustments" and the
"productivity-less-inflation factor adjustment." Despite pro
tests from ORA and AT&T that the reduction is inadequate,
the Commission ordered the reduction as proposed by PacBell
(in the amount of $244 million), effective February 1 , 1 999.
By July 1 , PacBell must submit specific tariffs (itemized
prices) which will yield the reduced allowable revenues.
Consistent with some of the protests, the PUC ordered
the use of the GDP (gross domestic product) deflator to mea
sure inflationary change in the value of money collected as
rates, and required PacBell to use that measure and to in
clude it in all future price cap filings.
• ISP Decision Issued. In October 1 998, the PUC issued
its final decision in Rulemaking 95-04-043, Investigation 9504-044. This proceeding was initiated by the PUC following
a March 1 998 application from the California Telecommuni
cations Coalition (MCI, Sprint, et al.) to determine jurisdic
tion and charges for calls that originate with PacBell and then
go through a competitive carrier. The Commission affirmed
its jurisdiction over such calls and their pricing, and held that
reciprocal compensation agreements between PacBell and the
c onnecting competi t i ve carrier would apply. When a

customer's local call originates with one local exchange
carrier's network and terminates in another's network, it is
attributed to the carrier from which the call originated (by
federal provision). Importantly, such "local" calls are distinct
from long d istance calls w h i c h merely pass through
interexchange switches. They i nvolve access charges, rather
than reciprocal compensation fees. Hence, they are subject to
the PUC schedule for such access charges.
The impetus for this proceeding and the decision is to draw
lines which will facilitate fair competition and clear delinea
tion of who pays what for what as consumers use a PacBell
phone to hook into a local competitor, who in turn hooks a
consumer into the Internet. The clarification prevents PacBell
from getting extra funds based on where a call goes after it
leaves the local "unbundled" network controlled by the utility.
Although arcane, its impact is significant given the potential
complication of FCC jurisdiction over the call based on its
connection into an interstate network, particularly the Internet.
Commissioners Duque and Neeper dissented, with the latter
contending that Internet traffic is essentially interstate and can
not be bifurcated based on the allegedly artificial distinction of
a preliminary local connection. Neeper argued that the FCC's
exemption of access charges for Internet traffic is not a defer
ral of jurisdiction to state PUCs, but merely a reflection of its
policy of assisting Internet growth, and that the FCC position
therefore conflicts with the majority view.
• Pending Structural Proceedings with Ratemaking
Impact. Rulemaking 93-04-003 pertaining to network archi
tecture and "bottleneck services" has been combined with 9304-002 pertaining to the PUC-initiated investigation into
"Open Access and Network Architecture Development of
Dominant Carrier Networks." This vaguely named proceed
ing will determine how much PacBell will charge competing
carriers for the use of its facilities (called "unbundled net
work elements" or UNEs). What the PacBell charge should
include, and whether it should include PacBell's overhead or
fixed costs, are critical decisions where PacBell is also to
compete against those very carriers it charges for the use of
its facilities. The interim decision of the administrative law
judge is expected in November 1 999, and may well be af
fected by now-pending litigation.

Status of Utilities'Year 2 000 Preparation
The Year 2000 (Y2K) problem arises when computers
are unable to recognize the date 01/01/00 as January 1 , 2000,
and instead read the date as January 1 , 1 900. It is thought that
without some sort of software fix to this problem, many com
puters will produce nonsensical results or shut down com
pletely. The PUC recognizes that it does not have sufficient
resources to audit and correct all of the systems of the regu
lated utilities to make them Y2K compliant. [16: 1 CRLR
166-67] The Commission is therefore focusing its efforts on
a process to verify that utilities have (a) a correcting plan, (b)
a schedule for remediation, and (c) a contingency plan in the
event of unforeseen problems.
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affirmatively chooses another supplier; (2) require public util
In November 1998, the Commission issued resolution
ity gas corporations to be the exclusive provider of specified
M-4792 requiring utilities under the jurisdiction of the PUC
services, including meter reading, billing, leak investigation,
to file a survey which outlines how they have and are cur
pilot relighting, and inspecting customer piping and appliances;
rently addressing any Y2K problems for each of their opera
(3) require the PUC to require electrical corporations to pro
tions. The survey requires the utilities to prioritize their Y2K
vide basic electrical service, including metering, billing, and
efforts and to address safety and reliability of service deliv
collection service, to all customers unless a customer affirma
ery systems ahead of billing and other administrative sys
tively chooses another ESP (if another provider is chosen, that
tems. The Commission reports that "many" of the utilities
entity may also provide metering, billing, and collection ser
have responded. The Commission is in the process of deter
vices to the customer); (4) delete the PUC's existing authority
mining what compliance or enforcement actions will be taken
to investigate further restructuring of natural gas services; and
against those who have failed to respond to the survey or
(5) delete the PUC's existing authority to investigate a process
otherwise comply with the Commission's orders.
for establishing default electrical service. {A. Appr]
Beginning in March 1 999 through March 2000, utilities
AB 1003 (Wright), as introduced on February 25, would
are required to provide the Commission with quarterly up
fine-tune the ongoing restructuring of the electrical services
dates on the status of their efforts. Contingency plans must
industry under AB 1 890 (Brulte) (Chapter 854, Statutes of
be developed and filed with the Commission by July 1 , 1 999.
Each utility must certify that its systems are Y2K compliant
1996), which provides for the authorization of direct transac
or "Y2K ready" by November 1 , 1 999. A "Y2K ready" sys
tions between electricity suppliers and end use customers,
tem will not recognize the year 2000, but is determined to be
and for the creation of an Independent System Operator (ISO)
suitable for continued use in spite of the problem. In addi
and Power Exchange (PX). AB 1 890 also created a fi ve-mem
tion, energy utilities are required to participate in regional
ber Oversight Board to, among other things, oversee the ISO
Y2K efforts.
and PX, and to determine the composition and terms of ser
On April 1 , in response to strong public interest in how
vice and to appoint the members of the governing boards of
utilities are coping with the Y2K problem, the PUC issued a
the ISO and PX. The Oversight Board is the appeal board for
second Y2K resolution intended to clarify that the public in
majority decisions of the ISO's governing board.
terest in utility readiness outweighs utility desires for confi
AB 1 003 would revise specified provisions relating to
dentiality in most cases. Resolution M-4793 declares that all
the creation of the governing boards of the ISO and the PX,
information provided to the Comand to the duties of the Oversight
mission about utility readiness is The PUC issued a second Y2K resol ution Board. The bill would require the
open to public scrutiny. Minor intended to clarify that the public interest in ISO and the PX to each be admin
exceptions were made for several utility readiness outweighs utility desires for istered by a governing board ap
utilities that demonstrated to the confidentiality in most cases. Resolution M- pointed by the Oversight Board
PUC's satisfaction that previously 4793 declares that all information provided to until an unspecified date, at which
provided information should be
time the membership of those
the Commission about utility readiness is open
kept confidential. Utilities seeking
governing
boards would be reconto public scrutiny.
to keep information confidential
stituted to provide for members
must demonstrate that the inforrepresenting entities that com
mation they wish to keep confidential falls within a specific
prise distinguishable interest groups in the bulk energy mar
exemption in the California Public Records Act, and the pub
ket and members appointed to protect the public interest.The
bill would authorize the governing boards of the ISO and the
lic interest in nondisclosure must clearly outweigh the public
interest in disclosure.
PX to also appoint the president of the entity, as applicable,
to be a member of the governing board.
The Commission realizes that the Y2K issue, if not prop
erly addressed, has the potential to cause serious disruptions
AB I 003 would also authorize the Oversight Board to
in essential utility services to California ratepayers, which
review an action or a proposed action of the ISO to determine
may affect the public health, safety and welfare. The Com
whether the action or proposed action is in the public interest
of this state, and would require the ISO and the PX to give
mission believes that there is a "reasonable probability" that
notice and information to the Oversight Board regarding pro
some level of Y2K problems will occur, despite the best ef
posed actions likely to affect a significant public interest. The
forts of the Commission and the utilities.
bill would authorize the Oversight Board to engage in speci
LEG I S LATI O N
fied actions relating to electric restructuring, including but
not limited to directing the production of records, reports, or
AB 1421 (Wright), as amended April 26, would codify
other information concerning the reliability, security, opera
the notion that investor-owned utilities are the default provid
tion, or efficiency of the electric transmission system or of
ers of gas and electrical service. Specifically, this bill would
the markets administered by the ISO or the PX; investigating
( 1 ) require the PUC to require gas corporations to provide
certain matters related to the electric transmission system or
basic service to all of their core customers unless a customer
150
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the electric generation market; requiring specified entities to
produce specified verification materials; requiring the ISO
and the PX to adopt or modify standards for the public notice
and open conduct of meetings of the respective governing
boards of those entities; and designating representatives to
attend and monitor meetings of the governing boards and
committees of the ISO and the PX. Except as specified, this
bill would authorize the Oversight Board to treat as confi
dential information obtained by the Oversight Board, if the
Oversight Board makes a specified determination.
The bill would also require the Oversight Board to peri
odically evaluate inspection, maintenance, repair, and replace
ment standards adopted under existing law for the transmis
sion facilities under its control, and to require the ISO to re
vise those standards if the Oversight Board makes a speci
fied determination.
AB 1003 would also repeal Public Utilities Code section
360, which requires the PUC to ensure that existing and, if
necessary, additional filings with the Federal Energy Regula
tory Commission (FERC) request confirmation of certain elec
trical restructuring provisions, and seek the authority needed
to give the ISO the ability to secure generating and transmis
sion resources necessary to guarantee achievement of plan
ning and operating reserve criteria no less stringent than those
established by specified entities; and the portion of Public
Utilities Code section 365 which requires the PUC to facili
tate the efforts of the state's electrical corporations to obtain
authorization from FERC for the creation and operation of
an ISO and an independent PX, to participate fully in all pro
ceedings before FERC in connection with the ISO and the
PX, and to encourage FERC to adopt certain protocols and
procedures. [A. U&CJ
SB 96 (Peace). In addition to creating the ISO and the
PX, AB 1 890 (Brulte) stated legislative intent that California
enter into a compact with western region states, and that the
compact should require the publicly and investor-owned utili
ties located in those states that sell energy to California retail
customers to adhere to enforceable standards and protocols
to protect the reliability of the interconnected regional trans
mission and distribution systems. As amended March 1 1 , SB
96 would repeal that intent provision and, instead, state the
intent of the legislature to provide for the evolution of the
ISO and the PX into regional organizations to promote the
development of regional electricity transmission markets in
the western states and to improve the access of consumers
served by the ISO and the PX to those markets. The bill would
state that the preferred means by which that voluntary evolu
tion should occur is through the adoption of a regional com
pact or other comparable agreement.
If enacted, this bill would reflect legislative intent that the
ISO and the PX evolve into organizations that would serve the
western regional market and would be governed by members
selected by participating states and overseen, jointly or sepa
rately, by those states. This change reflects FERC's position
that the ISO and the PX, as corporations engaged in interstate

commerce of electricity transmission and wholesale power, may
not be governed e:xclusively by California. [A. U&CJ
AB 1393 (Wright), as amended April 15, would require
specified electric corporations-on and after January 1 ,
2002-to collect a surcharge to support cost-effective energy
efficiency and conservation programs, and require the PUC
to allocate the funds in accordance with criteria established
by the legislature. Specifically, this bill would: ( 1 ) require
the PUC to order specified electrical corporations to collect
and expend funds for cost-effective energy efficiency and
conservation activities, and to allocate 35% of those funds to
programs that affect residential energy use; (2) require speci
fied electrical corporations, on and after January 1, 2002, to
collect a surcharge of 1 .5 mills ($0.0015) per kilowatt hour
to support cost-effective energy efficiency and conservation
programs; (3) require the PUC to allocate the funds in accor
dance with administration and expenditure criteria established
by the legislature; (4) require the PUC to order electrical cor
porations to collect and expend funds for targeted energy ef
ficiency programs for low-income electricity customers in
accordance with a prescribed schedule; and (5) state legisla
tive intent that special emphasis be placed on programs to
reduce electricity bills of customer groups that have been his
torically underserved by energy efficiency or conservation
programs. [A. Appr]
SB 282 (Kelley), as amended April 20, would require
the PUC to include in its annual work plan access guide a
statement that specifies activities that it proposes to reduce
the costs of, and rates for, energy, including electricity, and
for improving the competitive opportunities for state agricul
ture and other rural energy consumers. SB 282 would also
require the PUC to include in its annual report submitted to
the Governor a statement that specifies its activities and
achievements in reducing the costs of, and rates for, energy,
including electricity, for state agriculture and other rural en
ergy consumers. [S. Appr]
SB 427 (Peace), as amended April 7, would require the
PUC to allow full-cost recovery by an electrical corporation
for a specified tree trimming program, under which an electri
cal corporation may trim or remove any tree that grows natu
rally in the rights-of-way or easements of the corporation after
documenting all trees and other major vegetation growing in
its rights-of-way and easements. The bill would require the
PUC to create a state advisory committee to select and list trees
appropriate for each region of the state; require the Depart
ment of Fish and Game to assist electrical corporations in de
veloping a plan to minimize the impact on nesting birds of tree
trimming programs, and to review the plan every five years;
and require the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection to
develop and implement a program to minimize the risk of plant
disease transmission in the conduct of tree trimming or removal
by an electrical corporation. [S. NR& WJ
SB 1159 (Sher), as amended April 21, would relax the cur
rent safeguards against "slamming," the unauthorized switching
of a customer's electric service provider (ESP). The bill would
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delete an existing third-party verification requirement for resi
dential customers when the change is made via the Internet or
via written transaction . The required verification would be pre
served for telemarketing transactions. [S. Appr]
SB 1194 (Sher), as amended April 20, is a PUC-spon
sored bill that would require the Commission to study the
feasibility of administering the low-income and energy effi
ciency programs mandated by AB 1 890 (Brulte) through a
non profit public benefit corporation. Through 200 I , these
programs are being administered by the major electric utili
ties. Beyond 200 1 , however, the PUC has expressed a prefer
ence for independent administration of the programs, and cre
ated two independent organizations, the Low-Income Gov
erning Board (LIGB) and the California Board for Energy
Efficiency (CBEE), for that purpose. The proposed indepen
dent administration of these programs-that is, outside state
government and civil service requirements-prompted labor
interests to intervene and challenge the PUC's proposal. The
challenge led to a State Personnel Board ruling rejecting the
PUC's creation of the LIGB and CBEE as independent bod
ies. Thus, the PUC seeks legislative input on the issue and
the authority to study the issue further. [S. Appr]
SB 1217 (Polanco), as amended April 2 1 , is similar to
SB 1 1 94 (Sher). Existing law requires the PUC to administer
six telecommunications programs, created pursuant to stat
ute and paid for by consumers via their telephone bills; the
PUC appoints advisory boards to each of these programs to
assist in their administration. SB 1 2 1 7 would codify the ad
visory boards for each of the six programs in statute, and cre
ate accounts in the state treasury to hold the program funds.
Effective June l , 2000, this bill would transfer administra
tion of the low-income rate assistance program and the low
income energy efficiency program to the Department of Com
munity Services and Development. SB 1 2 1 7 would desig
nate San Diego Gas & Electric Company, Southern Cal ifor
nia Edison Company, Pacific Gas & Electric Company, and
Southern California Gas Company as administrators of the
remaining programs through December 3 1 , 200 1 , and require
the PUC, by January 1 , 2002, to study the feasibil ity of ad
ministering these activities through a nonprofit public ben
efit corporation. This bill is also somewhat similar to AB 246 1
(Campbell), which was vetoed in 1 998 by then-Governor
Wilson. [16:1 CRLR 168] [S. EU&CJ
AB 991 (Papan), as amended April 22, would enact the
California High Speed Internet Access Act of 1 999. The bill
would require the PUC to monitor and participate in a speci
fied proceeding of the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) addressing whether to require incumbent local ex
change carriers (LECs) to permit interconnection by com
petitive data LECs at any technically feasible point, to permit
those competitive LECs to provide high bandwidth data ser
vices over telephone lines with voice services provided by
incumbent LECs.
If the FCC adopts an order on or before January 1 , 2000,
with regard to that federal proceeding, the bill would require
1 52

the PUC to comply with, and implement, as the PUC deter
mines necessary, that order, consistent with state and federal
law, within 90 days from the date the order becomes final. If
the FCC does not adopt an order in that proceeding on or
before January 1 , 2000, the bill would require the PUC to
examine the technical, operational, economic, and policy
implications of interconnection and, if the PUC determines it
to be appropriate, to adopt rules to require incumbent LECs
in this state to permit competitive data LECs to provide high
bandwidth data services over telephone lines with voice ser
vices provided by incumbent LECs.
This bill is intended to give California residential con
sumers a choice of high speed data providers using "digital
subscriber line" (DSL) technology. DSL allows a high-speed
data channel to run on higher frequencies above the frequency
used to deliver analog voice signals. By separating the line
into a voice channel and a high-speed data channel, a single
telephone line can carry both voice and data services sim ul
taneously and, potentially, each service could be provided by
a different carrier. DSL provides residential users with the
ability to connect to the Internet at speeds 50 times faster
than modems. This bill is intended to ensure that customers
can choose to receive DSL service from either the incumbent
LEC or a competitive LEC at an affordable price. This bill
does not affect the provision of high-speed Internet access by
cable television companies. [A. Appr]
AB 365 (Wright), as amended April 28, would require
the PUC to develop and place on the Internet information
about local and long-distance telephone services offered by
providers and other consumer information. The bill would
prohibit the Commission from implementing the above re
quirement until July 1 , 200 1 , unless otherwise authorized by
the Department of Information Technology. [A. Appr]
AB 818 {Knox), as amended April 28, would require the
PUC to develop and implement any measures that it deter
mines to be available for telecommunications service pro
viders that possess telephone number prefixes to efficiently
allocate telephone numbers within those prefixes. The bill
would require the PUC to immediately request the FCC to
delegate to the state authority over telecommunications un
der specified federal communications law, to the extent that
the delegation will permit the PUC to implement specified
measures. The bill would require the PUC to request, and
telecommunications providers to provide, certain information
on telephone number use. The bill would require the PUC to
impose certain requirements on telephone number assign
ments, and to prepare and submit to the legislature a report
on that information on or before July 1 , 200 1 .
The intent of this bill is t o stall the introduction of new
area codes {see MAJOR PROJECTS). The bill makes sev
eral findings: ( 1 ) the number of area codes in California has
more than doubled since 1 991 ; (2) the proliferation of area
codes has caused undue hardship on citizens of California,
who have begun to be forced into new area codes after years
of having the same telephone number; {3) that proliferation
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has substantially increased costs to businesses, individuals,
and government agencies; (4) new area codes require the re
placement of business cards and letterhead stationery, and
companies must use employee time contacting their custom
ers to ensure that those customers are able to continue to reach
the affected company; (5) the proliferation of area codes has
also reduced worker productivity as employees begin using
new and unfamiliar area codes; (6) it is the policy of the leg
islature that ex isting area codes should be preserved for as
long as possible; and (7) it is the further policy of the legisla
ture that the hardship currently experienced by telecommu
nications customers as a result of the creation of new area
codes should be alleviated. [A. Appr]
SB 932 (Bowen), as amended April 20, would require a
telephone corporation that provides a new telephone service
or feature to subscribers to immediately notify each subscriber
in writing of that new service or feature. The bill would au
thorize a subscriber, within five days from the date that the
subscriber receives such a notice, to request the telephone
corporation to suspend the provision of any telephone ser
vice or feature described in that notice, and would require the
telephone corporation, upon receipt of such a request, to sus
pend the provision of the specified telephone service or fea
ture. The bill would prohibit a telephone corporation from
imposing any charge for the suspension of a telephone ser
vice or feature; prohibit a telephone corporation from impos
ing any charge for any telephone service or feature that a sub
scriber does not use; and require a telephone corporation to
reimburse a subscriber for any charge imposed by that corpo
ration for the inadvertent or unauthorized use of a telephone
service or feature.
SB 932 would al so require a telecommunications ser
vice provider to provide a potential subscriber with clear in
formation about a telecommunications service offered, prior
to purchase, including but not limited to information about
prices, service options, and the terms and conditions of ser
vice. The bill would require an advertisement for a telecom
munications service to disclose price information . The bill
would also require a telecommunications service provider that
provides local telephone service to provide subscribers with
telephone directories. The bill would prohibit a telecommu
nications service provider from requiring a subscriber to de
posit a sum of money with the provider prior to establishing
an account and furnishing service that exceeds a specified
amount, or from disconnecting the local telephone service of
a subscriber for nonpayment of charges imposed by a third
party. The bill would authorize a telecommunications service
provider to require the social security number of a subscriber
to establish creditworthiness only if the provider determines
that no other reasonable means is available. Finally, SB 932
would require the Commission to create a means by which a
telecommunications service subscriber may compare prices
among telecommunications service providers. [S. Appr]
AB 1263 (Thomson), as amended April 7, would create
the California Wireless 91 I Task Force, consisting of speci-

fied representatives of the wireless telecommunications in
dustry and state and local government. The task force would
be charged with reviewing and recommending improvements
to local emergency telephone services for wireless telecom
munications end users. [A. Appr]
SB 177 (Peace and Burton), as amended April 2 1 , would
limit the eminent domain power of public utilities. Existing
law explicitly permits public utilities, with the exception of
cable television corporations, to exercise the power of emi
nent domain. This bill would prohibit telephone corporations
from condemning property unless that telephone corporation
is a carrier of last resort to provide telecommunications ser
vices to unserved areas, and establish a process by which a
public utility may condemn property for the purpose of com
peting with another public utility. This process would require
a finding by the PUC that either (a) the public utility is pro
viding services as a provider of last resort to unserved areas,
or (b) the public interest requires the project, the property is
necessary for the project, if the property is not acquired the
hardship to the public util ity outweighs any hardship to the
property owners, and the proj ect is located in a manner most
compatible with the greatest public good and least amount of
private injury.
The bill's authors maintain that in this era of deregulated
and proliferating utilities, the eminent domain power that was
established in the nineteenth century is due for revision. The
authors believe that it is appropriate to allow the PUC to more
closely regulate the condemnation power of utilities. [S.
EU&CJ
AB 1658 (Committee on Utilities and Commerce), as
introduced March 1 8, is a technical clean-up bill sponsored
by the PUC . It conforms the Public Utilities Code to name
changes of PUC divisions and to federal preemption in the
regulation of railroads and trucking, among other technical
changes. The bill is largely copied from AB 1 605 (Commit
tee on Utilities and Commerce), which was vetoed by Gover
nor Wilson in 1 998 because it conflicted with another bill
and because it made changes to the PUC's Deaf and Disabled
Telecommunications Program of which Wilson disapproved.
[16:1 CRLR 168] [A. Appr]
AB 1352 (Longville), as introduced on February 2, would
create the California Trucking Commission to educate mo
torists on the importance of the trucking industry, topics re
lating to highway safety, and sharing the road with trucks.
The Commission would be authorized to publish and dissemi
nate materials, develop educational programs, and perform
any other activities required to educate the public concernin g
highway safety in relation to motor vehicle interactions with
trucks. The Commission would be funded by an assessment
on trucking companies, and the bill would not become effec
tive until trucking companies vote by referendum in favor of
the bill . [A. Trans]
AB 301 (Wright), as amended April I 3, would require
the PUC to permit interested parties to petition the Commis
sion to adopt, amend, or repeal a regulation. If a petition is
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filed, the Commission must consider it and, within six months
from the date of receipt of the petition, either deny the peti
tion or institute a proceeding to adopt, amend, or repeal the
regulation at issue. If the PUC denies such a petition, it must
include a statement of reasons for the denial in its decision.
The bill would require the Commission to amend its rules, on
or before July 1, 200 1 , to provide more specific procedures
for handling a petition. [A. Appr]
SB 310 (Peace), as introduced on February 4, would pro
hibit the PUC from enacting or implementing any decision,
order, or rule that interferes with the rights and obligations of
the directors of a corporation, including a utility holding com
pany, to efficiently and effectively discharge their fiduciary
obligations to the corporation's shareholders.
The bill is apparently intended to supercede the PUC's
affiliate transaction rules, which are intended to facilitate the
establishment of a competitive energy marketplace by ensur
ing that utilities do not engage in anticompetitive behavior
with affiliated companies. The bill finds that "the adoption
and enforcement by the Commission of rules against
self-dealing, cross-subsidization, market power, and other
anticompetitive activities, however, must not interfere with
the ability of a utility holding company to efficiently and ef
fectively discharge its fiduciary responsibilities to its share
holders." [S. EU&CJ
SB 33 (Peace), as amended April 5, would change the
way the PUC President is chosen. Currently, the members of
the PUC elect one of their number as President of the Com
mission; this bill would require the Governor to appoint the
President of the PUC . The bill would also subject the
Commission's Executive Director and General Counsel to the
direct control of the PUC President; currently, the Executive
Director and General Counsel are hired, fired, and directed
by the Commission as a whole. The bill would also permit
the Governor to appoint up to four advisers for each Com
missioner. [S. Appr}
SB 531 (Baca), as amended April 20,would require the
PUC-by July 1 , 2000-to establish a procedure to permit
the filing of complaints via e-mail and over the Internet. The
electronic filing method would be available only for com
plaints where the amount in controversy does not exceed the
jurisdictional amount of small claims court (currently $5,000).
[S. Jud}

LITI GATION
On January 19, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certio
rari in SBC Communications, et al. v. FCC, et al., leaving
intact the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals at
1 54 F.3d 226 ( 1 998). In this case, and in related cases in other
circuits, SBC challenged a provision of the federal Telecom
munications Act of 1 996 under which the "Baby Bells"
(Regional Bell Operating Companies or "RBOCs") divested
from AT&T may not enter into long distance competition
unless and until each allows viable competition within its re
spective local telecommunications markets. The case attracted
1 54

numerous parties, including PacBell, as well as more than 30
amici curiae contributions.
The Telecommunications Act of 1 996 included a num
ber of "special provisions" applicable only to the twenty
RBOCs. Under the Act, a RBOC may not enter into Jong dis
tance competition without prior approval of the FCC, which
is to grant approval to a RBOC only after certifying that local
competition exists; even then, long distance service must be
provided through a separate affiliate. Similar restrictions ap
ply to manufacture of telephone equipment. Finally, the
RBOCs may not engage in electronic publishing or alarm
monitoring services until February 8, 2001 unless by sepa
rate affiliate or joint venture, and-in the case of alarm moni
toring-only if they were so engaged prior to November 30,
1 995. These provisions were challenged by the Baby Bells in
this case, and in a related case filed in the D.C. Circuit, which
upheld the statute on March 20, 1998. SBC Communications
v. FCC, 1 38 F.3d 4 1 0 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In both cases, the
RBOCs alleged that the special provisions violate their first
amendment rights, constitute a bill of attainder (unconstitu
tional legislatively imposed punishment without judicial due
process), and breach equal protection standards under the
fourteenth amendment. The Fifth Circuit similarly upheld the
statute and its special provisions, rejecting the claims by the
RBOCs, and is of special importance because of the denial of
certiorari by the Supreme Court applicable to it.
The RBOCs' bill of attainder argument contends that the
RBOCs were legislatively separated out for punitive treat
ment due to their asso c i ation with AT&T and its
anticompetitive wrongdoing, that such attribution is unfair
guilt by association, and is not constitutionally determinable
by legislative (political) act. The district court agreed, strik
ing the restrictions on this basis. The Fifth Circuit reversed.
The court did not reach the interesting issue of whether bill
of attainder objections can apply to corporations (as opposed
to individuals). However, it rejected the bill of attainder ar
gument because while legislation may single out one or a
group for disparate treatment (rather typically done in the case
of tax loopholes), it must also impose "punishment," which
is not the intent here. Rather, the special provisions are de
signed prophylactically to prevent a problem. The RBOCs
argued that such a motivation should compel similar treat
ment of their competitors, which are now arrayed within the
long distance market and remain free to impede competition
within the constraints of antitrust law, while the RBOCs are
compelled to affirmatively guarantee competition. The prob
lem with the RBOCs' arguments, as the court found, is that
the history and remaining quantum of monopoly power in
the RBOCs make them functionally different and appropri
ate for disparate regulatory treatment, including special obli
gations to stimulate competition (see MAJOR PROJECTS).

F UT U RE M EETI NGS
The full Commission usually meets every other Thurs
day in San Francisco.
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